pranešimai

presented papers

The Hegemony of the Convertible

_{santrauka (lietuviškai ir angliškai)>> /abstracts (in English and Lithuanian)>>}

1. Introduction

I experience the issues raised by this seminar as overwhelmingly topical, not only in the context of the three Baltic Countries of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, but in the Central and Eastern European countries and in the whole capitalist world as well. The notion of an ideological vacuum, of a faltering of the moral foundations of society is, of course, not new. The emergence of sociology as a separate discipline in the beginning of the 19th century was largely a reaction to an analogous experience called forth by the industrial revolution. The old social order with its estates, guilds, and relationships of authority and power had been supported both by ideology and habit. Nothing of it could any more be taken for granted. On one hand stressing the need for empirical social research, thinkers such as Saint-Simon and Comte devoted themselves on the other hand to a search of a new morality that could overcome the lack of social integration in their contemporary society. According to Saint-Simon,

/a/ New Christianity is needed in order to secure the victory of the principles of universal morality in its struggle against quest for egotist goals at the cost of the common good. This religion, the newest of them all, should bring all nations to the state of eternal peace by uniting them against every one who strives for egotist goals with disregard for the common good of mankind. /This religion/ should unite all nations against any such an unchristian government, that is ready to sacrifice the interests of the people for those of the rulers.[1]

The two great sociologists of the following century – Durkheim and Weber – approached the same complex of issues, but less reliant on the ability of intellectuals to deliberately construct a new basis for morality. Durkheim warned for the anomie facing contemporary societies; Weber described the substitution of tradition by rationality as disenchantment.

The anomie, ideological vacuum, or lack of ”natural” order that now characterises the post-communist Europe has, of course, its own unique prehistory of forcibly established order, consecutive revolt and radical change. However, we can also see it merely as another instance of a more general dilemma facing contemporary societies: The disruption of tradition and habit – either through revolution or rapid evolutionary change – rips the members of society off answers to fundamental questions about social order. The problem is, what kinds of questions can be answered by rationality; and whether, how and by whom the lacking answers are to be given.

2. The crises of world views

Information from Holy God

to the nation and people People serve

themselves not God. Religious service

is superficial. As a result

criminality flourishes

and great catastrophes will occur

The tower of the Dome will fall down

to the Schnell Pond The tower of St. Olaf’s Church

will burn [down]. The railway station and

[the public?] will suffer

The sea level will rise up to St. John’s Church.

But retreats again. As consequence of

a hurricane and an earthquake. If

somebody does not believe this

information from Holy God and

[tears it down?], he will be subjected to

Holy God’s punishment.

God´s punishments are severe and

just!

Announcements of this kind, painted on sheet iron, were placed in the vicinities of buss stops in Tallinn in late 1990 or early 1991.[2] The announcement is illustrative of an important aspect of the social transformation in that period: The breakdown of real socialism shook more than “merely” the political and economic foundations of the societies concerned.  It is no coincidence, that the early 1990s saw a flourishing of interest in millenniarist sects, UFOs and other “paranormal” phenomena throughout the formerly socialist world.[3] The foundations of what was defined as “knowledge” was shaken; this coincided with new possibilities of interpreting the external world and perceiving one’s own position in it. The political crisis was accompanied by simultaneous epistemological and ontological crises and a crisis of identity.

Whatever ideas of an alternative society there were before the final turns of 1988-1991, they never constituted a comprehensive programme. The Central and Eastern European revolutions have been characterised as ”double-rejective” – i. e., as motivated by protest against foreign domination and communism as a system of power, rather than by a clear set of future goals.[4] People were conscious of what they were abandoning, but there were obvious reasons for why their visions of the future could never be very elaborate. Although almost everybody could agree on such objectives as independence, democracy and market economy (and no doubt, the material standard of living in Western Europe), few had any detailed practical knowledge of how all these things functioned in the ”West”. 

The most important reason for the lack of future-bound planning was, however, the lack of any reliable basis for it. As Karl Marx has put it, ”mankind always sets itself only such tasks as it can solve”.[5] There were no previous examples of a country abandoning the political and economic system prevailing in the Soviet Union and other member countries of the communist bloc. On the other hand, there was the experience both of tragically ended reform attempts (as in 1956 and 1968) and of finding a modus vivendi in a carefully sustained balance between the population´s expectations and the demands from Moscow. Those demands were never fully predictable; liberalisation of the regime could always be followed by a sudden return to the old. The limits had recently been shown by the proclamation of a state of martial law in Poland in 1981.

In September 1987 the proposal for a Programme of Economically Independent Estonia (Isemajandav Eesti; IME) became a symbol of political and economic reform attempts within the republic; moreover, it was the only concrete set of future goals that had been presented. However, not before long did it become obvious that carrying out the programme would not be possible because of the resistance of the all-Union authorities. With the emancipation of the Central and Eastern European socialist countries during 1989, full-fledged national independence started to look like a realistic option. The IME was finally abandoned by the radicalised Estonians themselves also.

But obviously, independence from the USSR could not be achieved through the action of Estonian social movements only. The chances for gaining it would be highly dependent on the Soviet leadership and also on international circumstances. Both were outside the control of Estonian independence activists. As a result, the more ambitiously independence-minded strategies ended up with almost no concrete goals to orient towards – apart from the mere abandonment of the Soviet economic and political system. This is one reason for the overall insecurity illustrated by the “Information from Holy God”. However, it is also one explanation to the popularity, which in 1990-1992 was gained by the idea of a restoration of the pre-war society, with its political institutions and property relations.[6] In comparison with the uncertainties of the present, the past seemed to represent a more solid reality.

The ideas there were on the future of the newly re-established state in 1991 can be summarised in a few words: First, an abandonment of the previous economic and political systems, and a wish to keep Russia at distance. These two elements represent the negative side of the revolutionary discourse. On the positive side, there were nothing else but vague ideas of “Western” capitalism and liberal democracy, an idealised picture of the pre-WW II society and, perhaps, one of “Europe”.

3. The new objectives

Ten years later, when looking at the new social order of the former Socialist bloc one cannot avoid the idea of it having been designed after what was told about the ideological enemy in the Marxist-Leninist textbooks of the previous regime. It is as if beggars on the streets, lack of social security, an open discrimination of women, and other conspicuous signs of inequality would for the new rulers be a proof of finally having reached that previously prohibited and secretly longed-for goal – Capitalism. Interestingly, the new order has by no means been pushed through by neo-liberal political parties only; in practical politics, the difference between them and other parties calling themselves conservative, nationalist, or even Social Democrat does not seem great. Despite the emergence of numerous ”loser” groups of the transformation, the prevailing political discourse continues to be that of the ”winners”.

On one hand, the dominating ideas have stressed the need of subsuming immediate individual and group interests to the long-term common goals of the nation. These include prosperity and, as its necessary precondition, international security. In order to reach the former goal, domestic entrepreneurship and foreign investment need to be encouraged. A future membership in the NATO is presented as the main instrument for reaching the latter. Joining the EU is instrumental from the point of view of both economic and security objectives. On the other hand, income redistribution by means of social policy is interpreted as interference with market mechanisms, which allegedly has the effect of slowing down the pace of economic development. The neoliberalist politicians´ standard answer to any demands based on ideals of equality or social justice is, that in a long run, all the present problems will be solved by the prosperity created by the “invisible hand” of market mechanisms.

The situation we are witnessing comes close to what by Antonio Gramsci was called hegemony: The “intellectual and moral leadership” of a class in power or striving for power.[7] In short, the identity of a member of the “nation” has pushed into the background or delegitimated other possible, class- or interest-based identities. At the same time, the “nation” does not appear to be much more than a “mutual-benefit-society”.[8] What is good for the entrepreneurial class, is good for the nation.

4. The hegemony of the convertible

The treatment of economic prosperity as the primary or only goal of politics is certainly not typical of the post-communist countries only, but a tendency long ago noted and criticised in Western Europe.[9] Also the rejection of active social policy belongs to the neo-liberal thinking which since two decades has gained ground in the whole Western capitalist world. Here, I agree with the organisers of the present seminar on an affinity between the post-communist and ”post-modernist” contexts. One could even say, that the ”post-modernisation” of political life has come further in the East than in the West. Many of those institutions that are functioning as obstacles for that development in Western Europe are weak or non-existent in the formerly socialist countries – I am referring to, e.g., trade unions, institutions of social policy, and voluntary associations. More than ever is there a lack of common moral principles that could enter what Saint-Simon called the ”struggle against a quest for egotist goals at the cost of the common good”. For this aristocrat and revolutionary, the common good meant equality and fraternity; for post-communism and post-modernism, neither one of these values seems to rate high. 

I already discussed the historically specific reasons for the sudden surfacing of what was called a value vacuum in the post-communist countries; from a more general point of view, we are dealing with the retreat of metaphysical values when faced by rationalist argumentation. The development points at a crisis and at a progressing impotence of all ideas on good society that are substantial rather than technical. However, this is not where it ends. What follows has been said by many; wishing to widen the range of quotable authors, I refer this time to a text from 1936 by the Finnish philosopher Erik Ahlman:

In the beginning, traditions were followed without questioning their legitimacy, they were taken for granted. However, since an introduction of their analysis and criticism, nothing will be accepted unconditionally any more. /…/ Representatives of the ”enlightenment” consider themselves opponents of metaphysics, but without noticing it, they still rely on certain metaphysical foundations. For example, /…/ they continue to argue on the basis of rationality, justice, humanity, logic. Accordingly, these principles are presumed to be valid without further consideration. But they can in fact be valid only if one presupposes a kind of metaphysical faith. That is, a faith of the same kind that one considers oneself be fighting against.[10] 

The quotation depicts a logical sequence from modernism based on rationality to the present situation, where the very foundations of rationality are undermined by rationality itself. The passage from modernism to post-modernism is no rupture, but logical development in a known direction.

The argument also shows the impossibility of, in fact, any social order to be built on rational foundations only. If no metaphysical values are to be acknowledged, the ultimate consequence is hard to imagine and hardly rational; it would perhaps mean the disappearance of society as an ordered community of people, a return to a Hobbesian war of every one against every one. Of course, this perspective is still very far from what has been accomplished by the neo-liberal political current dominating the political life of post-communist countries – it has merely substituted other, substantial values by prosperity. Measurable and seemingly universally convertible, the goal of economic prosperity appears as the most ”value-free” of all political goals imaginable. 

The new leading ideas – prosperity and international security of the “nation” – both seem to be rather non-ideas. Not in spite of, but just because of their “impersonality and colourlessness”[11] – their abstract emptiness, they were able to serve as smallest common denominators for members of a society, who had abandoned the previously dominating ideology before ever having time to negotiate with each other on a new one. In a situation where no other political objectives could be universally accepted, money and security got the chance of serving as their substitutes.

5. Is there a remedy?

Durkheim and Weber described the retreat of inherited norms and values as a consequence of social change. At the same time, they were convinced that after a stabilisation of the new social order, much of social life will continue to be based on norms emerging without conscious rational planning. This has very much remained the prevailing sociological view. I would summarise it as a combination of conservatist concern for the erosion of common values with a more optimist inclination to believe on society´s ability to spontaneously fill the vacuum with new contents.

What is this cautios optimism based on? I think, that it builds on an insight of the non-reducibility of human action to any universal model of rational calculation. For an illustration: If we treat the Prisoner´s Dilemma as a model of decision-making, we have already forgotten that in real life, not all persons – e. g., the homeless – would consider a long jail sentence the worst possible option. What is rational and desirable from the point of view of one actor, might not be it for another.

Importantly, there is not only a lack of rational foundations for social values; there is also a lack of foundations for any claim of subordinating these values to abstract reasoning. This is what I consider the constructive message of the way of thought now known as post-modernism. It serves to strengthen our awareness on the limits of any purely technocratic idea of progress. Values such as justice or dignity are hardly reducible to any one convertible currency. Or, further: What is the price of clean environment? What is it worth to be listened and to be accepted as participant in decision-making? The ”prosperity” promised by contemporary capitalism does not bring about all the things that people consider essential for a better quality of life. Their ”metaphysical faith” in other values is rooted in their own experiences and it will not be eradicated by rationalist rhetoric.

The problem for us today is, that the other values have to be explicated, argued for and fought for; that is, the hegemony of the one value claiming universal convertibility can only be broken through the emergence of a pluralist civil society. Time is needed – a relative stability in Central and Eastern Europe, enabling people to become aware of their own values and interests, and to build solidarities. But sooner than we might think, the time is ripe – in the near future if not now already, provided such a process is not deliberately suppressed. I think that also our present seminar is a sign of the times. After a long period of insecurity and unpredictability, the members of society are about to begin a dialogue on what constitutes a good society.

6. Works Cited

Ahlman, Erik, Kulttuurin synty ja kuolema [The Birth and Death of Culture]. In: Erik Ahlman, Teokset IX [Collected Works, Vol. IX]. Jyväskylä: University of Jyväskylä, 1936/1993: 85-92

Gramsci, Antonio, Selections from the Prison Notebooks. Ed. and transl. by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith. London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1971

Habermas, Jürgen, Legitimation Crisis. London: Heinemann, 1973/1976

Habermas, Jürgen, Citizenship and National Identity. Appendix II in Jürgen Habermas: Between Facts and Norms. Transl. by William Rehg. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990/1996

Holmes, Leslie. Post-Communism: An Introduction. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997

Kligman, Gail & Katherine Verdery. Reflections on the ‘Revolutions’ of 1989 and After, Eastern European Politics & Societies, Vol. 13 No. 2 (1999): 303-12

Lagerspetz, Mikko, Postsotsialistlik identiteedikriis ja kodanikuühiskonna perspektiivid [Post-Socialist Crisis of Identity and the Perspectives for Civil Society]. Sirp, 7 May, 1999: 3, 19

Marx, Karl, Preface to A Critique of Political Economy. In: Karl Marx, Selected Writings. Edited by David McLellan. Oxford etc.: Oxford University Press, 1859/1990: 388-92

Platz, Stephanie, The Transformation of Power and the Powers of Transformation: The Karabagh Movement, the Energy Crisis, and the Emergence of UFOs in Armenia at the Dawn of Independence, Manuscript, 1997

Comte de Saint-Simon, Claude Henri, Neues Christentum. Dialoge zwischen einem Konservativen und einem Neuerer. Übersetzt von Dr. Friedrich Muckle. In: Werner Sombart (ed.), Grundlagen und Kritik des Sozialismus. Erster Teil. Berlin: Askanischer Verlag, 1824/1919: 35-59

Shtromas, Alexandras, How Political Are the Social Movements in the Baltic Republics? Nationalities Papers, Vol. XVIII, No. 2 (Fall 1990)

Simmel, Georg, Money in Modern Culture, Theory, Culture and Society, Vol. 8 (1991) (1896/1991): 17-31

Tismaneanu, Vladimir, Introduction. In: Vladimir Tismaneanu (ed.): The Revolutions of 1989, London & New York: Routledge, 1999: 1-16